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SPAZI DI LIBERTÀ. UNIVERSALITÀ ASTRATTA E CONCRETA NEI LINEAMENTI DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIRITTO DI HEGEL
(pp. 5-18)

ABSTRACT

For Hegel, objective spirit is the development and realization of freedom on the social and political level. By the development the spaces of freedom in respect to nature could be extended, but also the spaces of freedom in ethical and political life: abstract right, morality, bourgeois society and (political) state are irreducible spheres of freedom in modernity. Here the sphere of right is crucial; the sphere of action for a person is limited by right. Right, for Hegel, is the existence of freedom as the result of a political history. Its abstractness is the condition of the equality of all men and of personal freedom.
ABSTRACT

Starting with some Alain Badiou’s political reflections, the author describes the status quaestionis of community referring to Plato’s fundamental thesis in The Republic. For Badiou in his dialogue with Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, Agamben, Blanchot, the relationship between impossibility and community is essential. The present essays is focused on such a relationship through blending together Nancy’s “singular plural being” and the condition of the philosopher in Plato’s Republic.
ABSTRACT

The text develops from an anthropology that considers the human being as an “inhabitant, in transit”. In particular, one reflects on the spatial aspect in order to clarify the relationship between forms of space and social patterns. Ways of living together differently take form through sharing knowledge and practices, the function of memory and the figures of the imagination: these are both spatial and “spatialising” (create space). Relationships are expressed in their spatial form. The world wide web, on the other hand, does not seem to have replaced, but rather transformed the way of living differently, of seeking contact and relationships (this is an aspect which must be considered in depth, in its outcomes, with particular attention to ways of coordinating social contacts). Learning to “focus-on” and trying to escape superficial thought, philosophy can play a critical and eutopic role offering categories, paradigms, perspectives.
ABSTRACT

The paper will develop some aporias about the concept of “community” in the modern thought. First of all some difficulties that are involved in the idea of a “society of individuals” are deeply analysed. Descartes and Hobbes are discussed in this perspective. Secondly some problems that arise in relation to the idea of “mass” are developed. Heidegger’s thought is focused from this point of view. Finally a notion of “community”, which is based on a new concept of “relationship”, is outlined. This idea can offer a solution for the described aporias.
ABSTRACT

In this paper I argue that true community is always a community of faith. This means – as Bonhoeffer taught – that spiritual communion should never be an “immediate” relationship of individuals among themselves. This is exactly the point where the opposite interpretations of common life of Communitarianism and Bataillism fail.
ABSTRACT

A revival of the community “after” the transition to society is only possible by regaining the community from society. This involves the maintenance of specificity and peculiarities of the individual and the private with the statement of holism in a new configuration of the relationship between whole and parts. But the community must be closely intertwined with the structure of the recognition of concrete subjects as expressions of cultures, religions and traditions in which the community nexus is embodied. The unity of the community is compatible with pluralism. The community structure is dynamic and therefore must be necessarily intertwined with globalization. Not universalism versus particularism, but community individuality in the universality.
ABSTRACT

According to the political community as a community of freemen and equal, Aristotle introduces a new connotation in the one-many relation, and in the conception of nature as an end. The model of the arché politikē penetrates deep into the Aristotelian metaphysics, coming into conflict not only with the limitations of his conception of political freedom, but also with the despotic principle that pervades his entire teleology. The article points out these aspect that prepares the universality of modern liberty, in comparison with the Hegelian critique of the identification between freedom and Lordship and with the Hegelian conception of the relationship between unity and diversity according to the “community” character of the divine.
ABSTRACT

Understanding other minds is a performance that reveals a dialectic tension between community and plurality. The paper explores this tensions analyzing the contemporary debate about mindreading. The debate is interpreted as focusing on two contrasting views centered on the notion of rationality and simulation. Two different moments of the history of analytic philosophy such as Ryle and his criticism of Collingwood and Quine and his criticism of Davidson are examined. They are valued as contributing to solve the contrast between simulation and rationality and suggesting how to find an equilibrium between the assimilatory instances represented by community and the respect of the other as different that the notion of plurality suggests.
ABSTRACT

The essay examines the essential nexus that connects philosophy and life in the classical Greek thought, rejecting the perspective that individualizes in the originary metaphysics the time in which the thought is abstract from the real life to keep itself in an atemporal dimension. The analysis is leaded by a critical comparison with Arendt’s reading of Plato, that supposes a radical separation between nous, philosophical reason turned to the eternal, and the logos, connected to the temporality and characteristic of man’s intersubjective dimension in the polis. The separation between nous and logos typical of Arendt’s interpretation of Plato is considered as a basic element of the idea about a metaphysic subordinating praxis and politics, and it is responsible for the degradation of life’s sphere in the name of a theoría in which the same life doesn’t recognize itself.
This essay reconstructs the cognitive and rational role of mimesis in Adorno’s model of knowledge as “differentiation”. It puts forward an interpretation of the ability of “thinking through constellations”, and of language to “grasp the thing”, that points out how far Adorno’s proposal is from “the old realism of objective representation der alte Abbildrealismus”. It also aims to make explicit how Adorno’s model of knowledge can really account for some recent neurophysiological achievements concerning the mimetic level of the mind-world relationship and how it contributes to a convincing interpretation, rationalist but anti-intellectualist, of some of their epistemic implications. In this way the essay aims to probe Adorno’s contribution to a paradigmatic change in the conception of the mind-world relationship and argues against the interpretation that, from Wellmer to Habermas, tried to relegate Adorno’s thought within the limits of the subject-centered paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness that he himself criticized.
ABSTRACT

This article aims to understand Heidegger’s reflection on subject, truth and world, thanks to his comparison with Leibniz. In order to intend this, the article faces the course of 1928 named Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik, where Heidegger delineates and explains his research on a Fundamentalontology starting from Leibniz’s thought concerning truth and substance. The correlation of these questions allows to understand the original monadological conception of being in Leibniz, in which Heidegger finds the ground for a revolutionary interpretation of subject – intended as impulse – as essentially related to the world, or better, in Leibnizian terminology, as mundus concentratus.
The relationship cannot be understood as a medium between terms, i.e. in the sense of a monodyadic construct. If understood in that sense, it does not produce an “aporia”, but a true contradiction: reconciling the identity of terms, which involves their independence, with their common reference, which involves their dependence. The relationship does not arise, then, between identities, but in the inherent structure of each identity, and must be understood as the act of self-relating of each determinate identity, and it is for this reason that it manifests itself as a sign. The mediation, in other words, is not the structure of what is immediate, that is its articulation, according to the concept of the original structure presented by Severino, but the act of self-mediating. This implies that the act, not the structure, has original value.